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ABSTRACT: This paper addresses the problematic nature of bureaucratic power struc-
tures and their effectiveness. The paper argues that delay constitutes the essence of 
bureaucratic power and has controlling effects on all of the three temporal modes 
– past, present, and future – that individuals are subjected to. The exteriorized and 
exteriorizing nature of temporal consciousness in particular is showcased thanks 
to Bernard Stiegler’s conception of the relation between technics and time. By dis-
cussing Franz Kafka’s fi ction as well as the most common bureaucratic encounters, 
the paper argues that both the formal and the repetitive character of bureaucratic 
procedures are not only facilitated but even presupposed by the constitution of 
temporal consciousness, which is prone to temporal delay and to the controlling 
mechanisms that come along with it.
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Starting with Max Weber1 in the dawn of the 20th century and continuing with 
such thinkers such as Michel Foucault2, Henri Lefebvre3, Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer4, the question of the relation between power and bureaucratic 
structures has been extensively scrutinized. Although it cannot be claimed that 
every power structure is accompanied by some kind of bureaucratic activity, the 
reverse formulation holds true: if there is a bureaucratic structure, there has to 
be a power-imposing activity involved. The important shift in the theory and the 
critique of bureaucracy is related to the technological boom in the late eighties. 
As Graeber puts it, “a critique of bureaucracy fi t for the times would have to 
show how all these threads-fi nancialization, violence, technology, the fusion of pu-
1 Max Weber’s Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1925) in particular. 
2 M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Paris, Gallimard, 1975. M. Foucault, 
Histoire de la sexualité. Tome I (1976), Tome II and III (1984), Paris, Gallimard. M. Foucault, 
Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Paris, Gallimard, 1975.
3 Henri Lefebvre’s trilogy Critique de la vie quotidienne: Critique de la vie quotidienne (1947), 
Critique de la vie quotidienne II, Fondements d’une sociologie de la quotidienneté (1961), Critique 
de la vie quotidienne, III. De la modernité au modernisme (Pour une métaphilosophie du quoti-
dien) (1981).
4 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialektik der Aufklärung (1944) in particular.
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blic and private-knit together into a single, self-sustaining web”5. The question 
which remains to be raised is the following: what nowadays renders bureaucratic 
power different from other structures of control? We claim that the mechanism 
running bureaucratic power is a temporal delay. Turning towards Franz Kafka’s 
literary work is useful as it is situated between a metaphysical interpretation of the 
modern world and a social critique towards its defi ciencies. Since temporal delay 
does not constitute just one of the possible modes of existence of bureaucracy, the 
intertwined character of ontologically charged and critically oriented discourse is 
inevitable. Because every power structure is itself temporal, delay as the essence of 
bureaucratic power is conditioned by the ontological tension between interiority 
and exteriority that renders spatiotemporality the central subject of our discourse.
1. Spatiotemporality as a Means of Control
The distinction of time as a form of interiority and space as related to exteriority 
has its roots in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason where the philosopher 
extracts space and time from the fi eld of cosmology and employs them as tran-
scendental forms of intuition which are supposed to enable the formation of ap-
pearances as spatiotemporal as well as the very distinction between the apprehen-
ding consciousness and the object apprehended. However, the idea of something 
interior remains extremely problematic both regarding the contents of the interior 
apperceptions as well as the transcendental form which enables their emergence. 
Let us turn to Bernard Stiegler’s Passer à l’acte where he recalls the spatiotem-
poral experience which he had lived during his incarceration. Being imprisoned 
means living within a circle of repetition with no rupture except the release which 
results in a shift from one cycle of repetition to another at most. The temporality 
in prison appears to be much more restricted than the temporality outside the 
bars because of the extremely limited space: life among four walls, the same inma-
tes, the repetitive selection of meals served exactly at the same time, and regular 
walks in the spatially limited courtyard. As Stiegler notices, when one is deprived 
of her world comprised of choices, she is rendered incapable of structuring her 
being in the world6. This is when the idea of an interior fi eld which would remain 
intact to the controlling forces comes to mind as a promise of liberation from the 
imposed rhythms. Stiegler claims to have realized that even though the everyday 
life in prison brings no actual change or any hope for it the living memory of the 
consciousness tends to transform day after day7. Apparently, everything that Stie-
gler manages to fi nd in his consciousness is related to memory: the books he has 
read, the works of art he has encountered, and the language he has learned and has 
5 D. Graeber, The Utopia of Rules. On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucra-
cy, Brooklyn, Melville House, 2015, p. 42.
6 B. Stiegler, Acting Out (2003), Engl. transl. by D. Barison, D. Ross and P. Crogan, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 26-27.
7 Ibidem.
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been applying since. Interiority as a problem as well as a necessity emerges when 
a rhythmically monotonous temporal order is faced by the consciousness. Yet any 
attempt at investigating the contents of the discovered interiority results in a failu-
re to distinguish between what is interior and exterior in relation to consciousness.
Alongside Husserl’s notions of primary and secondary retentions, Stiegler in-
troduces the idea of tertiary retention which is “the prosthesis of consciousness 
without which there could be no mind, no recall, no memory of a past that one 
has not personally lived, no culture”8. According to him, tertiary memory always 
takes part in the primary and in the secondary memories as well as in the process 
of constitution of my present self. Stiegler’s approach allows us to see that Kantian 
Self is always already exteriorized: it is surrounded by its objects which are at the 
same time its prostheses – the situation resulting in constitution of a non-lived past 
which, according to Stiegler, can become someone’s past if and only if it becomes 
their future9. In other words, exterior traces (such as language) can constitute an 
impact to the consciousness only after having been actualized, appropriated, inte-
riorized in such a way that they would become a part of conscious self-hood and 
thus take part in its project. 
It could be objected that the claim about the essential bond consciousness has 
with technics can only be made from the perspective of the active consciousness and 
thus serves as a projection of the vision of human essence. According to Hansen, 
the idea of the tertiary retention is doomed for contradiction as long as the project 
resides in explaining the effect technics has on consciousness without surpassing 
the consciousness itself10. By refusing the metaphysical distinction between the or-
ganic and inorganic, Stiegler showcases the essentiality of the relation between con-
sciousness and technics yet it does not necessarily mean that Stiegler’s project leads 
to a contradiction. As long as one accepts the idea that collective time measurement 
(calendars, time zones, clocks) and synchronized rhythms (working hours, annual 
festivities, traffi c jam frequencies) affect individual temporality in a signifi cant way, 
the presupposition of a clear and strict distinction between personal and collective 
temporality cannot be taken seriously. Moreover, the distinction of authentic and 
inauthentic temporalities is challenged11. Once stuck in a traffi c jam and feeling bo-
red, I may plunge into the temporality of the melody that is airing or I may start 
day-dreaming which would cause me to enter into the sphere of an altered temporal 
8 B. Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3. Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise (2001), Engl. 
transl. by S. Barker, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011, p. 39.
9 B. Stiegler, Technics and Time, 2. Disorientation (1996), Engl. transl. by S. Barker, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 49.
10 M. B. N. Hansen, Technics Beyond the Temporal Object, in “New Formations”, 2012, p. 46.
11 For instance, both Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger exploit the distinction of the au-
thentic and the inauthentic. Defending the idea that duration can be spatially measured only if it 
concerns the time that has passed and is not actually lived, Bergson echoes Heidegger’s discourse 
on the difference between Dasein’s care as its mode of projecting its being and Das Man’s forget-
fulness once trapped among careless mundane activities. Both thinkers rely on a presupposition 
that there are two different temporalities and the only criterion to distinguish between them is 
their proximity to the human subject.
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structure where time may fl y extremely fast as I fantasize about the distant future or 
it might freeze as I contemplate the pattern on a car seat. My inner temporality is 
structured by the images which offer their own temporal rhythms – but where do 
these images come from? On the one hand, it is my imagination that projects, com-
poses and structures the imagery of my day-dreaming in the traffi c jam; on the other 
hand, the imagery that is reactivated by my imagination has not been entirely created 
by it and can fi nd its prototypes in the outside world. Needless to say that being in 
constant need of exteriorization (in the form of language, tools, technology, etc.) 
renders human consciousness prone to being “hacked” by the exterior temporal 
structures which are employed to constitute, shape, and restructure one’s personal 
temporality. The technical essence of human beings explains the possibility of drea-
ming someone else’s dreams12 or succumbing to the industry of imagery13. 
Since temporality is exterior and exteriorizing, it is destined to control and to be 
controlled. With this insight in mind, the episode when K. meets the inspectors in 
the fi rst pages of Kafka’s The Trial can be read within its full scope of temporality. 
When K. expresses his disbelief in the situation he has gotten into, one of the inspec-
tors says to him: “yes, you have been arrested, but that should not prevent you from 
going to work. Nor should anything prevent you from going about your daily life 
as usual”14. The fi rst pages of The Trial do not depict K. entering the process of the 
trial – the fi rst scenes of the book depict the stupor of K. after he realizes that he has 
always been in the process of the trial. If K.’s being late to realize he has always alre-
ady been within the process can be explained by the exteriorizing nature of the hu-
man consciousness, the process of the trial which necessarily progresses in a mode of 
delay is to be explained by the specifi c spatiotemporality of bureaucratic structures. 
The delayed realization of a complex structure the subject fi nds itself in is closely 
related to the violent nature of both self-consciousness and the logic of hierarchical 
organizations that implies a mechanism of control and oppression. Kafka’s position 
as a writer can be viewed as a situation where the ambivalence of the violence in 
question is exposed. Following Fort’s project of reimagining Kafka’s literary work as 
dealing with the crushing imperative to write, the importance of the relation betwe-
en the literary act dismantling the modernist tradition of narrative and bureaucracy 
as one of the crucial aspects of the modern world needs to be stressed. According to 
Fort, in Kafka’s The Trial “the violence of an absolute subjection to language insofar 
as its social enactment, in the form of a ‘court’, projects a transcendental dimension 
that would positively guarantee and enforce it”15. Both bureaucracy and language 
function as a control mechanism that has a clearly distinguishable – and thus prone 
12 In one of the interviews given in 1987 and aired in FR3 television under the title Qu’est-ce 
que l’acte de creation?, G. Deleuze utters his famous phrase: “if you are caught in the dream of 
another, you are screwed”.
13 See M. Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, Frankfurt am Main, 
Fischer Taschenbuch, 1989.
14 F. Kafka, The Trial (1925), Engl. transl. by M. Mitchell, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2009, pp. 14-15.
15 J. Fort, The Imperative to Write. Destitutions of the Sublime in Kafka, Blanchot, and Be-
ckett, New York, Fordham University Press, 2014, p. 101.
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to dismantlement – structure. The imperative to write touches upon the impos-
sibility precisely because the given (i.e. the language that precedes its user both 
temporally and ontologically) is supposed to be interiorized by the one fulfi lling the 
imperative to express herself, whereas the bureaucratic existence mirrors the alrea-
dy mentioned tension in that it necessitates a full engagement of the individual who 
is both the source of content for the formal procedures of bureaucratic systems as 
well as the matter that is reshaped and restructured by them. Fort’s interpretation of 
Kafka’s literary project as an attempt to fulfi ll the imperative to write brings forward 
is the revolutionary character of the act of writing: in resisting the urge to write like 
the tradition requires, Kafka not only is dismantling the rules of a modernist narra-
tive but also showcasing the loops in the logic of any bureaucratic structure that is 
proper to modern world. That way, mediation in a form of writing becomes a means 
of both revelation and diagnosis leading to blurring the line between the interior 
and the exterior of the writing subject.
Apparently, neither restructuring of space nor its control could be possible if 
no temporality was involved. According to Karl, distortion is the key to read the 
spatiality of The Castle where the tightness of space mirrors the limitedness of 
Klamm, the symbol of authority in the novel16. Karl then proceeds to expand on 
the temporal aspect of the fi gure of a labyrinth: “in realistic fi ction, the presen-
ce of an intermediary indicates one has approached the seat of power; one can 
negotiate with the minor offi cial, who acts as a stand-in for the principal offi cer. 
Kafka scrambles his spatial concept by making the intermediary separate K. even 
further from the seat of power”17. The asymmetry of human circulation between 
the castle and the village (the people from the castle are the ones who decide when 
to come down whereas the villagers climb up rarely and if they eventually do, it is 
not them but the people from the castle who initiate the transition), the discrepan-
cies between daily rhythms in the castle and in the village (the bureaucrats from 
the castle work unnaturally late or early hours once they descend to the village), 
the fact that the castle and the village people rarely meet face to face – all these 
seemingly spatial distinctions have a temporal dimension which functions as a de-
lay that causes an ontological difference between the two spheres in question. As 
noticed by Weinstein, the fact that The Castle remains unreachable results not only 
in a myriad of ontologically ambiguous spaces but also has a degrading effect on 
the entities taking up the transitory space in question: “in the course of time Frie-
da becomes Olga, Olga becomes Pepi: interchangeable not characterogically but 
structurally – unknowable, talking fi gures K. meets, listens to, may make love to”18. 
The blurring of ontological differences between particular entities results from the 
formalizing effect of strictly structured spatial relations that impose a monotonic 
temporal rhythm upon the living.
16 F. R. Karl, Space, Time, and Enclosure in “The Trial” and “The Castle”, in “Journal of Mo-
dern Literature”, 6 (1977), 3, p. 430.
17 Ibidem, p. 435.
18 P. Weinstein, Unknowing. The Work of Modernist Fiction, Ithaca and London, Cornell 
University Press, 2005, p. 140.
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Yet bureaucracy is effective as a power-imposing structure precisely because our 
spatiotemporal condition within the world contains the potential of and for bure-
aucracy. The perfect parabola of the controlling spatiotemporality of bureaucracy 
could be Kafka’s short story Before the Law where the adverb “before” functions 
both spatially and temporally. The story begins with a description of the situation: 
“before the law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper, there comes a man from 
the country and prays for admittance to the Law. But the doorkeeper says that he 
cannot grant admittance at the moment. The man thinks it over and then asks if 
he will be allowed in later. ‘It is possible,’ says the doorkeeper, ‘but not at the mo-
ment’”19. Not allowed to face the Law, the man spends his life in front of the open 
gate before he discovers that this gate was destined only for him. 
Being “before the law” means both spatial and temporal positioning. Even 
though both the doorkeeper and the man from the country are facing each other, 
only the doorkeeper is before the gate in the fullest scope since aside of his spa-
tial positioning before the gate, he is also temporally prior to it. The man from 
the country comes and leaves while the doorkeeper stays as the one whose role is 
to preserve the rules. Thus the fi rst conclusion to be made is that the man from 
the country is late to witness both the opening of the gate as well as its closure, 
only the doorkeeper can fully access the radical “before” of the law having the 
opening and the closure of the gate at his disposition. In this regard, the law ap-
pears to be rootless, or, to follow Derrida’s reading of the parable, the question 
of the origin of the law throws us to the domain of the impossible. According to 
him, the historic and contextual emptiness of the law makes it impossible to be 
in front of it in the sense of facing the law: neither being in the presence of the 
law, the man from the country and the doorkeeper remain blind and separated 
both from each other and the law itself20. The asymmetry in question resides in 
the fact that the members of the opposition remain outside of the structure they 
are supposed to be a part of. Inclusion by excluding thrives on temporal discre-
pancies. The restriction to face the law is interiorized by the man leading to a 
twofold result: on the one hand, the respect for the law helps to facilitate the 
interiorization of the law itself, and on the other hand, the interiorization of the 
law leads to the constitution of the ontological difference between what is to be 
interiorized and what performs the interiorization. In this regard, the temporali-
ties of the man and the law appear to be intertwined and function as a delay both 
phenomenologically (being late to witness the opening or the closure of the gate) 
and ontologically (being late to realize the coincidence of one’s lifetime with the 
time of the law).
19 F. Kafka, Before the Law, in Franz Kafka. The Complete Stories, Engl. transl. by W. and E. 
Muir, New York, Schocken Books, 1993, p. 13.
20 J. Derrida, Préjugés. Devant la loi, in La faculté de juger, Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 
1985, p. 119.
Filosofia     DELAY AS (NON)FOUNDATION OF BUREAUCRACY 65
2. Temporal Delay as the Essence of Bureaucratic Power
Delay can be defi ned as tension between the expectation and the given situation 
which activates the dialectics of the virtual and the actual. For a bureaucratic system 
to function, all the attention has to be paid to the actual actions – documents to fi ll 
in, signatures to be collected, offi cers to be consulted, etc. Yet alongside the obvious 
bureaucratic acts, the virtual domain lingers as the real reason for getting involved in 
all of the machinery. One’s wish to get married with the loved one, to sell a house, or 
to start a new business – all of these goals do not coincide with neither are fully re-
presented by the bureaucratic procedures one has to endure in order to accomplish 
them. In fact, the more bureaucratic activities extend, the harder it is to trace back 
the real whose activities they were supposed to facilitate. This is the kind of delay 
which cannot be escaped even in the most smoothly running bureaucracies – as long 
as fi lling another blank is not my goal per se, my relation to a bureaucratic system is 
one of a constant waiting fuelled by the tension between the virtual and the actual.
In contrast to the productive virtuality that Deleuze introduces as the creative 
source of what is present21, the virtuality that is touched upon bureaucratic tem-
porality is closer to what we could call an ontological desert. The main difference 
here resides in speed: virtuality, which is an ontological surplus, constitutes a more 
concentrated and thus an accelerated domain of the real whereas the presence-
based actuality remains confi ned to the principle of one-way causality and the logic 
of linear temporality. Meanwhile, the virtual which is opened by a bureaucratic 
structure has no relation (neither an oppositional nor a creative one) with the ac-
tual real since instead of dealing with ontological contents, bureaucratic structure 
is all about formalities and procedural actions whose functionality is based on the 
very fact of not having a content.
Pure formality of the bureaucratic virtual leads to an arrest of the temporal 
fl ow as is the case of Kafkan characters that never arrive at their destination point 
because the rootless and endless bureaucratic structure stalls them in-between the 
ontological domains. As Kavaloski remarks, the exclusion of Josef K. in The Trial 
from the normal fl ow of time results in an arrested narrative present which consti-
tutes and intermediary ontological fi eld residing between the state of being fully 
awake and the state of dreaming: “if he had emerged immediately from bed and 
gone directly to Frau Grubach, the court might not have intruded into his life. This 
vulnerable transition from sleep to wakefulness is above all a temporal moment 
when consciousness is being reconstituted”22. By turning the usual state of affairs 
into an abnormal one, the trial turns over the regular temporal logic which leads to 
a full abolition of the one-directional principle of causality. The trial has no distin-
guishable cause and no defi nitive fi nale which is exactly the defi nition of a stalled 
time, i.e. the bad virtuality.
21 G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (1968), Engl. transl. by P. Patton, London, Con-
tinuum, 2001, p. 83.
22 J. Kavalovski, Fabula interrupta: The Rupture of Narrative and the Arrest of Time in Franz 
Kafka’s Der Proceß, in “Modern Austrian Literature”, 36 (2003), 3/4, p. 46.
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3. Delay and Past: Simplifi cation
For a bureaucratic structure to have a signifi cant effect on an individual’s mode 
of living and self-perception their relation needs to be more complex than in the 
case of an opposition or the situation of oppression. Robertson suggests that the 
template for understanding the subject’s relation to an institution should be retri-
eved from the family where the internalization of the standards of behavior takes 
place fi rst23. Even though the possibility of explaining the power relations between 
an individual and a bureaucratic system solely on a pseudo-psychoanalytic basis 
is doubtful, we can at least agree with the idea that there is a particular type of 
personality needed in order to successfully function within the logic of a bureau-
cratic institution. Therefore, the following task is to retrace the steps taken in the 
formation of a bureaucratically structured personality.
From the very fi rst moments of K.’s encounter with the offi cers in The Trial, a 
temporally asymmetric power relation is activated. The most illustrative moment 
of the asymmetry between the bureaucrats and K. is constituted through docu-
mentation. K. is asked to show his personal document whereas the interrogators, 
even when asked to do the same, refuse to do so. To represent oneself through a 
personal document means succumbing to the logic of identity that precedes its 
own bearer. Our documented identity surpasses our own temporality in two ways. 
First, the date and place of birth as well as our name and surname are prior to the 
active and self-conscious capacity of understanding. Second, once inscribed into 
the bureaucratic documentary system, the information about us outlives us in the 
form of birth and death statistics, unpaid loans, etc. To be documented means to 
outlive oneself yet what really surpasses the physical and intelligent presence of 
ours is an extremely formalized and simplifi ed identity. The very same simplifi ca-
tion is performed within the fi eld of self-refl ection: once the documented identity 
is interiorized and appropriated by its holder, the radical temporal split emerges 
within the consciousness. A signifi cant part of “us” is reserved to the atemporality 
of the bureaucratic identity which leads to admitting that from a certain point of 
view I have never lived (my name is prior than the living and conceiving I) and at 
the same time I am never ceasing to live (my body can die but the inscriptions in 
bureaucratic documentation are not going anywhere).
The stalling effect of bureaucratic system usually remains hidden in everyday 
encounters because the transitioning from non-bureaucratic fi eld to the domain 
of bureaucracy is rarely captured by us. Kafka’s writings allow us to see the blur-
red area of existence as self-exposing mediation: by no longer hiding behind the 
purpose it is supposed to serve, bureaucracy in Kafka’s universe is presented as 
a formal structure whose main mode of being is malfunction resulting from the 
ontological discrepancy between the law and its literary expression. Commenting 
on the episode in The Trial where K. discovers pornographic pictures en lieu of 
23 R. Robertson, Kafka, Goffman, and the Total Institution, in Kafka for the Twenty-First 
Century, eds. S. Corngold and R. V. Gross, New York, Camden House, 2011, p. 142.
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legal texts inside the law books, Weinstein notices that “in the narrative where law 
books are fi lled with pornographic pictures, where painting are representationally 
delusive, where lawyers are all pettifoggers, where the offense is undiscoverable, 
and where the incessant deployment of rational language obtains neither clarifi ca-
tion nor results – in such a muck-fi lled world the subject’s efforts avail nothing”24. 
After having abandoned its function as a structure-giving force, writing becomes 
a meaningless execution of sign-production. When the causal principle, that has 
been structuring the relation between the law and writing, is abandoned, time is 
stalled without being directed towards any destination.
The atemporalizing effect of a documented identity is also responsible for our 
blindness to the structural organization of bureaucracy. While the fact that the 
right hand of bureaucracy is ignorant of what the left hand is doing guarantees 
the smooth functioning of the whole system, it has a dangerous effect on the or-
dinary citizen. As Weber has already noticed, the bureaucratic system follows an 
extremely general set of rules which leads to a situation where the agency is not 
destined to regulate the matter “by individual commands given for each case, but 
only to regulate the matter abstractly”25. The self-performed blinding stems from 
the already analyzed identity split: while my “bureaucratic self” functions within 
the logic of the system, my “everyday self” appears to be free from the bureaucratic 
procedures. Yet such a liberty is just an appearance: while my “bureaucratic self” 
is active, the experiences of the “everyday self” are put on hold. For instance, I 
cannot enjoy the moments with a relative who lives in another country until I get 
the visa which requires a whole chain of procedures.
Putting the “everyday self” on hold leads to a dismantlement of any temporal 
self whatsoever. Classic narrative functions as an unfolding of the main character’s 
qualities through time which is often accelerated by a disruptive event leading to 
a transformation within the character’s personality. Whereas in Kafka’s narrati-
ves, the protagonists remain active in a passive way, i.e. their transformation never 
arrives as the characters usually lack background or personal details, and not to 
mention the sterile milieu where the action of Kafka’s novels takes place. To quote 
Weinstein, “Kafkan modernism invokes the fantasy of release and arrival in order 
to deepen the stakes of arrest. We realize, at a certain point of our reading, that we 
are not going to get anywhere; where we are is where we are”26.
Until now we have been developing the phenomenological aspect of the past-
related delay of bureaucracy, so the time has come to discuss the ontological level 
of the issue. In his short story The Problem of Our Laws, Kafka writes about the 
impossibility for the people to reach the laws which are in the disposition of the 
noble. This leads to questioning the existence of any laws whatsoever: they could 
be forever lost within the course of history, passing onto the nobility the power 
of applying their will which is not grounded on any law yet parades itself as such. 
24 P. Weinstein, op. cit., p. 139.
25 M. Weber, Economy and Society (1922), Engl. transl. by G. Roth and C. Wittich, Califor-
nia, University of California Press, 1978, p. 958.
26 P. Weinstein, op. cit., p. 172.
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One could interpret this text of Kafka from the leftist point of view by analyzing 
the tension between the nobility and the people, the urge for a better future, the 
question of a possibility of uniting people for a single reason, etc. Yet within the 
scope of our investigation, the paradoxical nature of the laws is the most impor-
tant aspect of the story. Kafka writes: “any party that would repudiate not only all 
belief in the laws, but the nobility as well, would have the whole people behind 
it; yet no such party can come into existence, for nobody would dare to repudiate 
the nobility”27. The problem with the law is not the fact that it is in the hands of an 
unwanted group; it is much more fundamental.
A number of Kafka’s commentators agree on the emptiness and invisibility of the 
law around which Kafkan narratives turn. Derrida stresses the empty essence of the 
law in the story The Problem of Our Laws: according to him, the nobility represents 
an essence without an essence which means that they can be never exposed or re-
presented and are just left to fl oat around without settling neither here nor there28. 
It is not the case of substituting the wrong leadership with another power source; 
there being nothing and no one to overturn, the power position remains occupied 
without ever being fi lled by a substantial representative. For Schuman, for instance, 
the Kafkan law represents a pure tautology which is not a non-sensical statement 
but at the same time is incapable of producing any content in the real. According to 
him, K.’s trial in The Trial is a perfect example of a system which “either lacks truth-
conditions altogether or they are hidden”29. Thus not only the origin of the law but 
also its application remain obscure which leads us to thinking that this obscurity 
constitutes its ontological core. The invisibility of the law brings into question its 
realness which appears to be trapped somewhere in between the temporal modes 
of the real. The moment when the law becomes valid is not exactly situated within a 
temporal scale – emerging as already activated, the law precedes itself. At the same 
time, the law is never fully actualized the same way as a long-awaited event takes 
part – the law is a promise of a unity which functions as a regulative rule-idea and 
not as a narrative for a state of things which could be actualized.
Having no content and origin, the law cannot be applied but through the most 
formal execution imaginable which strips down its meaning to a pure act of vio-
lence. As Eagleton notices, “if there is no justifi cation before the Law, it is for one 
thing because the Law says nothing which you could argue or agree with; it has 
no content beyond the sheer performative act of asserting its own dominion”30. 
Neither present nor past or future, the law appears to be atemporal and formal. 
Following Agamben, we can name the execution of such a law a pure ban which le-
ads to a situation described by the philosopher when he interprets K.’s situation in 
27 F. Kafka, The Problem of Our Laws, in Franz Kafka. The Complete Stories, Engl. transl. by 
W. and E. Muir, New York, Schocken Books, 1993, p. 277.
28 J. Derrida, op. cit., p. 123.
29 R. Schuman, “Unerschütterlich”: Kafka’s “Proceß”, Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus”, and the Law 
of Logic, in “The German Quaterly”, 85 (2012), 2, p. 159.
30 T. Eagleton, Sweet Violence. The Idea of the Tragic, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2003, 
pp. 148-149.
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Before the Law: “according to the schema of the sovereign exception, law applies 
to him in no longer applying, and holds him in its ban in abandoning him outside 
itself”31. The non-existence of law’s origin leads to a stalling effect in the present 
mode of being which leads to an upgrade from the procedure of simplifi cation to 
a structure of control.
4. Delay and Present: Control
The experience of waiting has a static effect on the way one experiences the pre-
sent. When K. asks the offi cers for the reason for him being arrested, he is asked 
to wait: “‘and now I advise you to go to your room,’ he added, ‘to remain calm 
and wait and see what decisions are taken in your case. We advise you not to waste 
your energy on pointless thoughts but to compose yourself, great demands are 
going to be made on you”32. The order expresses the whole logic of bureaucratic 
delay: nothing has changed except the fact that one realizes she has been caught 
in the net of bureaucratic procedures which have neither a beginning nor an end. 
The stalling effect of bureaucratic time can be well summed up by the term of mo-
nological temporality, employed by Kavalovski to discuss the narrative dynamics 
of The Trial. According to the interpreter, monological temporality structures the 
disconnected actions in the chapters of The Trial as well as represents the absence 
of communication between the main character and the trial leading to a deeply 
dysfunctional and unconnected temporal structure where neither past nor future 
interacts with present33. Bureaucracy’s power of control is founded on the fact that 
any bureaucratic process appears to the participants as always already activated 
since something has been arranged without us even knowing it, not to mention 
the power and the will which run the process as well as initiate it – the laws, the 
legal decisions, the institutions responsible for bureaucratic procedures, etc. Once 
activated, the bureaucratic process is never completed precisely because its result 
always leads to another stage of bureaucratic activities, and the chain of repetition 
is never broken. Bureaucracy does not presuppose any rupture since every change 
or unexpected case is supposed to be covered by the regulations that are applied 
in the system. 
Yet the monotonic repetition of bureaucratic procedures can be described using 
temporal vocabulary. In fact, even the thickest time of bureaucracy has its rhythm 
which we will call “the bad repetition”. I would like to recall my experience of the 
process of online tax declaration as an illustrative case of the frozen temporality 
of bureaucracy. The e-form of tax declaration is supposed to automatically signal 
if there are any spaces left unfi lled or any incoherent information put down. After 
31 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995), Engl. transl. by D. Hel-
ler-Roazen, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998, pp. 49-50.
32 F. Kafka, The Trial (1925), Engl. transl. by M. Mitchell, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2009, p. 9.
33 J. Kavalovski, op. cit., p. 45.
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the tax declaration deadline, one receives either a confi rmation about a successful 
declaration or is asked to edit it. While the observable bureaucratic chain seems to 
have diminished with the introduction of an electronic declaration system, the ele-
ment of control is as high as never before. To use the Graeber’s notion, the current 
situation of the bureaucratic world is ruled by The Iron Law of Liberalism, which 
states that “any market reform, any government initiative intended to reduce red 
tape and promote market forces will have the ultimate effect of increasing the total 
number of regulations, the total amount of paperwork, and the total number of 
bureaucrats the government employs”34. Instead of being imposed on us from the 
outside, the control mechanism is now being interiorized. The feedback on my tax 
declaration said that the percentage of tax payment should have been higher than 
I indicated. Therefore, I was asked to transfer the indicated sum to the governmen-
tal budget. If I do not do so, the money will be transferred from my active bank 
account automatically. This is very convenient yet so unnecessary – why did I have 
to fi ll in the tax percentage myself, if the system had all the necessary information 
to count it for me? My proper confi rmation is what makes the control exercised 
through the means of bureaucracy so powerful – although my declaration does not 
provide much new information for the government, it forces me to succumb to the 
rule and the law by repeating what is already known.
When one is asked to take up the ownership of the information, one’s whole 
identity has to obey, since the process in question does not end when one leaves 
the line to the bureaucrat’s offi ce. Foucault describes the major effect of the Pa-
nopticon as destined “to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent 
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power”35 even when there is no 
one who observes the inmate. Meanwhile, no interiorization of the surveillance can 
be performed in a bureaucratic structure because it does not rely on the distinction 
between the interior and the exterior, be it ontologically real or just apparent. 
When the shortcuts are made by switching from an old-style bureaucracy to the 
electronic form of it, it becomes clear that the real agent of bureaucracy is not the 
individual but the fl ow of information which advances within the static and repe-
titive present.
5. Delay and Future: Rendering One Static
The repetitive present of bureaucracy results in diminishing both individual and 
collective capacity of projecting onto something new and unpredictable. The pos-
sibility of static temporality is related to the projecting nature of consciousness, 
described by Heidegger’s term “ek-sistence”36: by dragging along its interests and 
34 D. Graeber, op. cit., p. 9.
35 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison (1975), Engl. transl. by A. 
Sheridan, New York, Vintage Books, 1995, p. 201.
36 M. Heidegger, Letter on Humanism (1947), in Idem, Basic Writings, edited by D. F. Krell, 
Engl. transl. by F. A. Capuzzi and J. G. Gray, New York, HarperCollins Publishers, 1993, p. 235.
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projects, Dasein shapes its present experiences and constitutes its future projects 
thus forming an originary temporality of being-in-the-world. In order to differen-
tiate the possible approaches to Dasein’s project we rely on the distinction betwe-
en the French future (as a preconditioned discursive future mode of things) and 
avenir37 (as radical openness and unconditionality of things to come). While future 
mode of projecting relies on discursive predictability and is usually associated with 
standardized, often collectively shared rhythmical patterns, the radical openness 
of things to come is normally associated with a disruptive character of the arrival 
of any kind of novelty. Although both future-oriented temporal modes are built on 
expectation, the predictable future is potentially already there, while the radically 
open unpredictability can only be captured by consciousness as a promise of a 
change. When it comes to the expectations formed in the state of bureaucratic de-
lay, neither of the regimes of the future-orientation is activated because of the lack 
of temporal context resulting from the formality of the procedures. 
While repetitiveness and delay that accompany every bureaucratic activity can 
be well illustrated by the image of a chain, spatial change does not necessarily 
guarantee temporal dynamics which is the case in Kafka’s short story An Imperial 
Message. After the death of the emperor, his last message is to be transferred to one 
of the ordinary citizens who live far outside the castle. The arrival of the temporal 
delay is inevitable, since the palace appears to be packed with people who came to 
commemorate the death of the emperor. The more energy the messenger puts into 
clearing his way through the crowd, the more obvious it becomes that the mission 
of delivering the message of the dead is itself doomed to perish in an ultimate delay. 
The hopelessness of the task is obvious: “and if at last he should burst through the 
outermost gate – but never, never can that happen – the imperial capital would lie 
before him, the center of the world, crammed to bursting with its own sediment”38. 
The message is being taken, the process of delivery has already begun, and it is 
enough for the process to be considered successful, even if the message never lea-
ves the palace where the power and the knowledge are concentrated. Despite the 
fact that the institutions exchange information, often using us as their messengers, 
the chain of bureaucracy’s isolating power – its palace – is never broken.
Although bureaucratic systems succumb to a strict logic of hierarchy, they are 
never centralized, since work-distribution is one of the essential principles of bu-
reaucratic organizations. The coordination of bureaucratic workers is founded not 
on their synchrony (as in the case of biological organisms) or the causality of their 
acts (as in the case of mechanisms) but on the diachronic, disjointed, and delayed 
37 The term avenir has been extensively exploited by Derrida in his Spectres de Marx and 
Deleuze in his La philosophie critique de Kant. In order to deconstruct the concept of presence, 
which is given priority to by metaphysics and phenomenology, Derrida and Deleuze exploit the 
Shakespearian metaphor in “Hamlet” time is out of joint: for Derrida the disjointed future can-
not come while for Deleuze it has already come virtually. That way, both philosophers end up in 
assigning the quality of rupture to avenir. 
38 F. Kafka, An Imperial Message, in Franz Kafka. The Complete Stories, Engl. transl. by W. 
and E. Muir, New York, Schocken Books, 1993, p. 15.
72 DAINA HABDANKAITE˙      Filosofia
temporality. We could not wish for a more illustrative example of the structural 
diachronic than Kafka’s interrogators in The Trial who utter the following: “these 
gentlemen here and myself are of minor importance as far as your case is concer-
ned, indeed, we know almost nothing about it”39. Instead of entering the juridical 
system right away, K. remains within the bureaucratic chain which is not the same 
as the juridical strata of the real where The Law can be faced. By restructuring 
one’s everyday temporality and restraining one’s spatial movement, bureaucratic 
procedure of the trial unveils the fact that one has never been free – as long as 
we all participate in bureaucratic procedures of any kind, our temporalities are 
restructured which results in both epistemic and ontological delay. This means 
that even though the bureaucratic process never ceases to take place, we as par-
ticipants, are deprived of any possibility of changing the given situation or the 
structural arrangement of the system by forming a content-charged expectation. 
The question which remains to be posed is the one concerning the possibility of 
liberation from the bureaucratic mechanism. Here it is important to draw atten-
tion to an interpretative tradition which prescribes a messianic power to Kafka’s 
narratives40: the relation between Kafka’s literal world of labyrinthesque structures 
encompassing rootless orientation-lacking characters and the world of bureaucra-
tic modernity is far from being just a descriptive one. The messianic, and thus 
liberatory, power of Kafka’s narratives resides not in their correspondence to the 
real but in their revolutionary approach to writing which results in turning around 
the temporal circle of the bad repetition. According to Samolsky, Kafka has forged 
a new kabbalah which is deeply rooted in the impossibility of writing in German or 
any language whatsoever and thus leads to being aware of the lack of hope in the 
future: “the impossibility of hope in his [Kafka’s] art was a symptom not of the fai-
lure of his writings, but precisely of their powers of forecast”41. To Samolsky’s idea 
that Kafka’s writing program shares the same logic as Derridian and Nietzschean 
39 F. Kafka, The Trial, cit., p. 12.
40 Most of the interpreters, prescribing messianic force to Kafka’s text, rely on the idea that 
his works, such as The Trial and others, exhibit the classic model of a terror state where violence 
turns to a sadistic treatment of minds and bodies, totalitarian logic intrudes into private lives, 
and killers are marked with an expression of boredom. In 1963, George Steiner makes an as-
sertion that Kafka “was, in a literal sense, a prophet” (G. Steiner, “K”, in Language and Silence: 
Essays, 1958-1966, London, Faber, 1967, p. 144). The infl uence of Walter Benjamin’s thought is 
also visible when it comes to interpreting Kafka’s role in literature and history in general. In his 
letter to Scholem written in August 11, 1934, Benjamin claims Kafka’s work to have a messianic 
aspect which functions as “the ‘reversal’ of the ‘studying’” (The Correspondence of Walter Ben-
jamin and Gershom Scholem. 1932-1940, Engl. transl. by G. Smith and A. Lefevere, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 135). Although Kafka himself had a profoundly negative 
vision of the future it does not fall under any modernist category of future-oriented narratives. 
Neither utopian nor dystopian, the future that shines through Kafka’s texts is dangerously open. 
After having been asked by Max Brod if there was any hope for us outside the world, Kafka 
replied: “Plenty of hope – for God – no end of hope – only not for us” (M. Brod, Franz Kafka, 
New York, Da Capo Press, 1995, p. 75).
41 R. Samolsky, Apocalyptic Futures. Marked Bodies and the Violence of the Text in Kafka, 
Conrad, and Coetzee, New York, Fordham University Press, 2011, p. 1.
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approach towards language and time42 we can only add that in order for the violen-
ce which produces and destroys the future to be fully exposed, a restructuring of 
the temporal chain has to take place. This restructuration relies on an exteriorized 
and exteriorizing ontological domain of literary language. Although, as showca-
sed by Herzfeld, bureaucracy is only noticed when it appears to be violating its 
own ideals43 its controlling and deeply restructuring effect on consciousness is the 
strongest in this self-blinding state.
One can think of acceleration or slowing down as the paths of temporal self-
organizing which would make an alternative to the bureaucratic delay yet they are 
all to be tested both in theory and in practice. Altering the speed of today’s domi-
nant processes in theoretical, political, and social fi elds constitutes a pharmacolo-
gical strategy since the very same thing that has a crushing effect on the temporal 
consciousness can open a new mode of temporality which would have a liberating 
effect on the socially enrooted mind. For instance, accelerationism maintains that 
we are at the beginning of a political project to come and, as proposed by Mackay 
and Avanessian, our practical and theoretical activity should be based on “a fi ctio-
nal or hyperstitional anticipation of intelligence to come”44. Needless to say that 
the possible strategies of altering the temporality of governing should be viewed as 
the modes of reform within the scope of critical attitude which is brilliantly captu-
red by Foucault as the question about “how not to be governed like that”45. Being 
governed differently does not mean becoming governance-free; the same goes for 
restructuring the temporal arrangement of subject’s being in the world: it does not 
free her from the exteriorizing nature of temporality which eventually results in 
constituting the phenomenology and the ontology of delay.
42 Ibidem, p. 53.
43 M. Herzfeld, The Social Production of Indifference. Exploring the Symbolic Roots of We-
stern Bureaucracy, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 3.
44 R. Mackay and A. Avanessian, #Accelerate#, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2014, p. 8.
45 M. Foucault, What is Critique? (1978), in The Politics of Truth, eds. S. Lotringer and L. 
Hochroth, Engl. transl. by L. Hochroth and C. Porter, New York, Semiotext(e), 1997, p. 28.
